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Introduction
Our ability to learn associations between events with reward-
ing or punishing outcomes plays an important role in guid-
ing our behaviour.1 Of equal importance is our capacity to
successfully alter established associations to maximize per-
formance when the environment requires us to change our
behaviour. When an event that previously led to reward
(event A) currently leads to punishment and when a previ-
ously punished event (event B) now yields a reward, the op-
timal behaviour would be to reverse the initial response ten-
dencies by starting to respond to event B instead of event A.
This principle is a driving force behind a form of behavioural
adaptation known as response reversal. Response reversal
can be defined as a change of behaviour following a reversal
of the previously established relationships between events
and their reinforcing value.2 Response reversal contributes to
flexibility in behaviour, both under social and nonsocial cir-
cumstances.3 The amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)
have been shown to play a crucial role in response reversal.3,4
The amygdala has been linked to the establishment of
 stimulus– outcome associations,5 whereas the OFC has been
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Background: Psychopathy is a severe personality disorder that has been linked to impaired behavioural adaptation during reinforcement
learning. Recent electrophysiological studies have suggested that psychopathy is related to impairments in intentionally using information
relevant for adapting behaviour, whereas these impairments remain absent for behaviour relying on automatic use of information. We
sought to investigate whether previously found impairments in response reversal in individuals with psychopathy also follow this di-
chotomy. We expected response reversal to be intact when the automatic use of information was facilitated. In contrast, we expected im-
paired response reversal when intentional use of information was required. Methods: We included offenders with psychopathy and
matched healthy controls in 2 experiments with a probabilistic cued go/no-go reaction time task. The task implicated the learning and re-
versal of 2 predictive contingencies. In experiment 1, participants were not informed about the inclusion of a learning component, thus
making cue-dependent learning  automatic/ incidental. In experiment 2, the instructions required participants to actively monitor and learn
predictive relationships, giving learning a controlled/intentional nature. Results: While there were no significant group differences in acqui-
sition learning in either experiment, the results revealed impaired response reversal in offenders with psychopathy when controlled learn-
ing was facilitated. Interestingly, this impairment was absent when automatic learning was predominant. Limitations: Possible limitations
are the use of a nonforensic control group and of self-report measures for drug use. Conclusion: Response reversal deficits in individuals
with psychopathy are modulated by the context provided by the instructions, according to the distinction between automatic and controlled
processing in these individuals.
implicated in behavioural adaptation based on contingency
changes.4
Patients with lesions of the OFC have been found to show
intact acquisition of associative relationships during initial
learning (hereafter termed “acquisition”), but to display dis-
turbed response reversal.5 Interestingly, disturbed response
reversal has also been demonstrated in individuals with
psycho pathy.6,7 Psychopathy is regarded as a severe personal-
ity disorder typified by emotional abnormalities in combina-
tion with severe antisociality.8 There is growing evidence that
cognitive deficiencies observed in psychopathy include ab-
normalities in emotional processing,9,10 modulation of atten-
tion,11,12 aspects of action monitoring13–15 and, importantly, as-
sociative learning.6,7,16–18 Behavioural results on associative
learning in individuals with psychopathy show deficiencies
in tracking  stimulus– outcome contingencies and in subse-
quently altering behaviour in the face of changes in these
contingencies.6,7 In the study by  Budhani and colleagues,7
 individuals with psychopathy showed normal acquisition
but impaired response reversal in a task in which  stimulus–
outcome contingencies varied according to predetermined
probabilities of gaining reward/ punishment (i.e., probabilis-
tic reinforcement learning). These results are in line with the
predictions made by the Integrated Emotion Systems model
of psychopathy.19 This account was developed from a neuro-
biological perspective and proposes that cognitive, affective
and behavioural abnormalities in individuals with psycho -
pathy are due to deficiencies in a cortical network involving
the amygdala and OFC. The model predicts that individuals
with psychopathy should not display impaired acquisition of
initial stimulus– response associations, as acquisition is not
 reliant on intact OFC and amygdala functioning. However,
these individuals should show deficient response reversal,
during which the integrity of OFC and amygdala functioning
is crucial for modifying previously established  stimulus–
response relationships based on information conveyed by the
outcomes.7
However, there are contradicting indications that learning
deficiencies can also become evident during initial acquisi-
tion learning. Von Borries and colleagues18 studied prob -
abilistic reinforcement learning in psychopathy using event-
related potentials (ERPs) and behavioural measures in a
different paradigm. Participants were explicitly instructed to
monitor and learn probabilistic associations through trial and
error. This study did not include a reversal phase and re-
vealed that individuals with psychopathy can also exhibit
 deficiencies during acquisition. Moreover, the electrophysio-
logical results indicated that participants with psychopathy
showed a specific deficiency in using information provided
through negative feedback to learn and adapt their behav-
iour. This is consistent with other results suggesting impair-
ments in the intentional use of available information to adapt
behaviour in individuals with psychopathy. Our group14 has
shown that both behavioural and electrophysiological cor -
relates of automatic (unconscious) processing of errors are in-
tact in individuals with psychopathy, whereas later stages
 involved in controlled (conscious) processing of errors and
behavioural adaptation are compromised.
Combined, the previous findings from our laboratory14,18
suggest that in individuals with psychopathy, automatic
adaptation of behaviour is unaffected, but impairments are
present when adaptation relies on intentional use of available
information. From this perspective, it can be hypothesized
that response reversal is compromised in individuals with
psychopathy specifically when instructions provide a context
promoting controlled behavioural adaptation. This predic-
tion is also supported by the observation that the participants
with OFC lesions in the study by Rolls and colleagues20 were
aware of (and could verbalize) the fact that the contingencies
had changed, but were still unable to execute response rever-
sal. Also, in the studies by von Borries and colleagues18 and
Budhani and colleagues,7 participants were aware that the
goal of the task was to learn based on reinforcement. A sec-
ond prediction offered by the distinction between automatic
and controlled behavioural adaptation in individuals with
psychopathy is that response reversal should be intact when
automatic learning is predominant. It is important to note
that our use of automatic learning refers to an implicit learn-
ing mechanism that does not rely on awareness of what is be-
ing learned21 occurring incidentally. To our knowledge, there
has been no previous exploration of response reversal in cir-
cumstances promoting automatic learning.
The aim of the present study was to explore the effect
of learning context (automatic/incidental v.  controlled/
intentional) on response reversal in individuals with psycho -
pathy by manipulating task awareness through the instruc-
tions given in 2 separate experiments. In experiment 1, the
 instructions facilitated automatic learning during a prob -
abilistic cued go/no-go task.22 Participants were instructed to
react as quickly as possible whenever the go stimulus ap-
peared. Importantly, they were not made aware that the task
contained predictive relationships. We expected reversal
learning to be intact in individuals with psychopathy com-
pared with healthy controls under these conditions. In the
second experiment, we used the same task, but the instruc-
tions were altered to make participants aware of the predic-
tive relationships and the ability to learn from them, thereby
facilitating intentional learning. Participants were instructed
to actively monitor for predictive relationships and to
 respond appropriately to receive reward. We expected re-
sponse reversal to be compromised in individuals with
psycho pathy under these circumstances.
Methods
Participants and procedure
Participants in the group with psychopathy were recruited
from the in- and outpatient population of the Pompestichting
Forensic Psychiatric Institute in Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
This is a treatment facility for people who have committed
offences partly owing to a DSM-IV Axis I and/or Axis II dis-
order. For inpatients, life in the clinic is designed to resemble
everyday life outside of detention as much as possible. They
are required to follow treatment, engage in educational activ-
ities, work, exercise and socialize.
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Suitable candidates were initially selected based on avail-
able information about clinical status and history. Subse-
quently, we used the Dutch version of the MINI Psychiatric
Interview23 and the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV
Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II)24 to screen candidates
who were willing to participate. We excluded individuals
with Axis I disorders (i.e., bipolar disorder, depressive disor-
der, schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, schizophreni-
form disorder, delusional and other psychotic disorders,
schizotypal disorder, schizoid personality disorder), as well
as first-degree relatives with DSM-IV Axis I schizophrenia or
schizophreniform disorder/somatic disorders. We also ex-
cluded those chronically using intoxicating substances and
those using psychotropic medication at the time of testing.12
Individuals with psychopathy and/or antisocial personality
disorder were precluded from participating in the healthy
control groups. All assessments were conducted by trained
psychologists based on interviews and on available informa-
tion from each patient’s clinical files. 
We estimated each participant’s IQ using the Dutch ver-
sion of the National Adult Reading Test,25,26 and psychopathy
was scored using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist — Revised
(PCL-R),27 an instrument yielding a psychopathy score based
on file information and a semistructured interview. As is cus-
tomary in Europe, the cut-off score was a PCL-R score of 26
or greater.12,28 In each experiment, the group with psycho -
pathy was matched for age and IQ with a community sample
of healthy male volunteers with a similar level of intelligence
and without a history of psychiatric disorders and criminal
records whom we recruited through advertisements. As the
controls did not have criminal records, no PCL-R scores were
assessed in this population.
The experimental protocol was approved by the local
ethics committee of the Radboud University Nijmegen. All
participants received written information about the experi-
ment, gave written informed consent and received financial
compensation.
Task and design
Experiment 1: automatic learning
This experiment consisted of an adapted version of a prob -
abilistic cued go/no-go reaction time (RT) task developed by
Fillmore and Rush.22 Participants were seated in front of a
100 Hz computer screen on which events were presented
against a white background. A trial started with the presenta-
tion of a fixation cross in the middle of the screen for 800 ms,
followed by a blank screen for 500 ms, a cue and either a go
or a no-go stimulus (Fig. 1). The cue consisted of a white rec-
tangle (65 mm × 20 mm) with black borders presented in
 either a horizontal (flat cue) or a vertical orientation (tall cue)
and was followed by a go or a no-go stimulus. Five different
stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs; 100, 200, 300, 400 and
500 ms) were used for the presentation of the cues to promote
allocation of attention to the cues and to prevent anticipation
effects for the onset of the imperative stimuli. The latter con-
sisted of a green (go) and a blue (no-go) rectangle (65 mm ×
25 mm) displayed in the centre of the screen for 1000 ms after
the cue signal. The orientation of the cue indicated whether a
go or a no-go stimulus was more likely to appear.
We instructed participants to press a response button as
quickly as possible when a go stimulus was presented and to
suppress their response when a no-go stimulus was dis-
played. Positive or negative feedback was provided on all go
trials but only on incorrect presses on no-go trials. More
specifically, the RT relative to the onset of the go stimulus
was displayed after a correct button press, which functioned
as positive feedback. However, when a button press was
made on a no-go trial, or when the participant did not press
the response button on a go trial, the word “incorrect” ap-
peared on the screen, representing negative feedback. To en-
courage fast responding, participants were told that they
would receive 5 points if the RT was equal to or below
300 ms, receive no points if the RT was longer than 300 ms
and lose 5 points if the word “incorrect” appeared on the
screen. No feedback or reward was given for not responding
on no-go trials.
The task consisted of 2 phases: an acquisition phase and a
reversal phase, each consisting of 500 trials divided into
5 blocks of equal size. The whole experiment lasted about
50 minutes. During the acquisition phase, the go stimulus
was preceded by the flat cue in 80% of the trials and by the
tall cue in 20% of the trials. The no-go stimulus had a re-
versed cue mapping: 80% tall and 20% flat. Thus, the orienta-
tion of the white cue was linked to the likelihood of a go or a
no-go stimulus being presented. Each SOA, stimulus, cue
and cue–stimulus combination appeared an equal number of
times during each block (for more details, see the study by
Fillmore and Rush22). Participants were informed that a cue
would appear to signal that a stimulus was coming and that
they did not have to react to the cues. During acquisition,
participants were expected to learn the probabilistic associa-
tions between the orientation of the cues and the type of
stimulus that followed without explicit information about the
true function of the cues. Thus, participants were not told
that there was a predictive relationship between the cues and
the stimuli, priming context-facilitated automatic learning of
the predictive associations. After reversal occurred, the map-
pings between the cues and the stimuli were reversed with-
out informing the participants. The acquisition learning ef-
fects were expected to become evident by a decrease in RTs
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Fig. 1: Sequence of events and their timing during the experiments.
associated with the flat cue, predictive of the occurrence of
the go stimulus on 80% of the trials during acquisition. In
contrast, the RTs on go trials following the less predictive tall
cue were expected to increase. After reversal, the opposite
pattern was expected: RTs after the flat cue that was previ-
ously predictive of the go stimulus on 80% of the trials were
expected to increase (as this cue no longer predicted the go
stimulus), and RTs after the tall cue that previously signaled
the no-go stimulus on 80% of the trials were expected to de-
crease. A short resting period was offered between blocks
and participants were not informed about predictive relation-
ships between the cues and the stimuli after the task.
Experiment 2: controlled learning
We repeated the same experiment about 2.5–3 years later.
However, in the second experiment, the colour scheme of the
stimuli was adapted, and participants received different in-
structions. We told participants to react if a red rectangle (go
stimulus) was presented and to withhold their response if a
yellow rectangle (no-go stimulus) appeared after a cue. The
key difference from experiment 1 was that the participants
were explicitly instructed that there was a predictive relation-
ship between the cues and the rectangles. They knew in ad-
vance that each of the 2 cues was more often followed by
 either the go or the no-go stimulus, but that these predictive
relationships were probabilistic. These instructions increased
awareness of the cue–stimulus contingencies and also resem-
ble those used in the studies conducted by von Borries and
colleagues18 and Budhani and colleagues.7 However, in our
study, participants were not explicitly informed that the pre-
dictive relationships could change during the task to prevent
the task from becoming too easy, thereby reducing the risk of
floor effects.
Analyses
We analyzed RTs on correct go trials using repeated- measures
general linear models (GLMs) for each experiment separately.
Acquisition learning was expected to become evident by a cue-
dependent change in RTs between the start of the task (start
acquisition) and the end of acquisition learning (end acquisi-
tion). Conversely, reversal learning was expected to become
evident by a change in RTs between the end of acquisition and
the end of the reversal phase (end reversal). Therefore, the
GLMs included block (start acquisition, end acquisition, end
reversal) and cue (tall, flat) as within- subject factors and group
(psychopathy, control) as a between-subject factor. The α level
was set at 0.05. The levels of the block factor corresponded
with the average RT of the first and last 100 trials of the acqui-
sition phase and the last 100 trials of the reversal phase, respec-
tively. The RTs between 100 ms and 2 standard deviations
(SDs) above the mean overall RT were calculated for each par-
ticipant, and RTs outside this range were excluded from the
analyses to reduce the impact of outliers.29 About 1.1% of the
trials were excluded in experiments 1 and 2, respectively. We
expected group differences in cue-dependent learning to be-
come evident by significant group × block × cue interactions.22
This interaction would indicate that the mean RTs differ signif-
icantly between the groups as a function of the cue factor in 1
or more blocks. Post-hoc analyses were conducted with Bon-
ferroni-corrected paired-samples t tests. Effect sizes (η2) were
calculated for each of the within- and between- subject effects
by dividing the corresponding sum of squares by the total sum
of squares.30 Greenhouse–Geisser-corrected p values are re-
ported where appropriate. 
Results
Participants
The group with psychopathy consisted of 18 participants in
experiment 1 and 21 participants in experiment 2. These sam-
ple sizes are comparable to those used in related studies.6,7
Nine individuals with psychopathy participated in both
 experiments. We initially included 20 participants in the
healthy control group in experiment 1; however, 2 were then
excluded because they did not completely understand or cor-
rectly follow the instructions. Therefore, 18 healthy controls
participated in experiment 1 and 21 were included in experi-
ment 2. One control participated in both experiments. Table 1
lists the demographic and clinical characteristics of partici-
pants in the psychopathy and control groups for each experi-
ment. None of the participants reported being colour blind,
and they all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Accuracy data indicated that each group achieved near-
perfect levels of accuracy in the experiments. The accuracy
Brazil et al.
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Table 1: Demographic and clinical characteristics of the
psychopathy and control groups for each experiment
Characteristic
Psychopathy Control
Experiment 1
n = 18
Experiment 2
n = 21
Experiment 1
n = 18
Experiment 2
n = 19
General, mean (SD) [range]
Age, yr 39 (7.9) 43 (7.0) 38 (8.4) 36 (8.8)
IQ 98 (9.1) 97 (10) 102 (6.8) 102 (5.6)
PCL-R score 31 (3.5) 31 (3.4)§ — —
[26–38] [26–38] — —
No. comorbid disorders*
Borderline 0 1 0 0
Antisocial disorder 12 15 0 0
Narcissism 5 5 0 0
Self-reported drug use, %†
Alcohol use‡ 0 0 0 32¶
Cannabis 44 43 17 21
Cocaine 28 33 0 5
Amphetamine 22 24 0 0
Methamphetamine 17 24 0 5
Opiate/morphine/
heroine
6 14 0 0
PCL-R = Hare Psychopathy Checklist — Revised;27 SD = standard deviation.
*Only current disorders identified in the populations are reported.
†Differences in percentage reported drug use were examined with 2-proportion z
tests. For each group, the proportions for experiment 1 were tested against those of
experiment 2.
‡Alcohol use was defined as consumption of more than 2 glasses of alcohol a day on
average.
§The exact PCL-R scores of 2 participants scoring above threshold were not
accessible.
¶Significant difference.
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level in the psychopathy group was 97.7% in the acquisition
phase and 97.2% in the reversal phase in experiment 1, and
99.8% and 99.5% in experiment 2. The control group had
97.3% and 96.9% accuracy in the acquisition and reversal
phases, respectively, and 99.9% and 99.7% in experiment 2. 
Experiment 1: automatic learning
The left panel of Figure 2 displays the mean RTs for each of
the groups, cues and trial blocks. As can be seen, there were
no large differences between groups; both showed large RT
differences between cues on trial blocks 2 and 3, but not
block 1. Statistical analyses revealed no significant main ef-
fect for block (F2,68 = 1.40, p = 0.25, η2 = 0.012), cue (F1,34 = 3.69,
p = 0.06, η2 = 0.023) or group (F1,34 = 0.116, p = 0.74, η2 = 0.003).
A significant block × cue interaction was indicative of suc-
cessful learning in general (F2,68 = 34.6, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.229).
This interaction reflected significantly faster responding after
the more predictive cue than after the less predictive cue on
the final block of the acquisition and reversal phases (264 v.
292 ms; t35 = –4.89, p < 0.001) and (286 v. 273 ms; t35 = 5.03,
p < 0.001), respectively, but not on the very first acquisition
trial block (282 v. 283 ms; t35 = –0.436, p = 0.67). The nonsig -
nificant block × group (F2,68 = 0.793, p = 0.46, η2 = 0.007), cue ×
group (F1,34 = 0.377, p = 0.54, η2 = 0.002) and block × cue ×
group interactions (F2,68 = 0.681, p = 0.51, η2 = 0.005) indicated
comparable performance between the groups.
Experiment 2: controlled learning
The right side of Figure 2 shows the groups’ mean RTs for
each cue and trial block. The major difference between
groups concerns responding during the reversal phase. On
block 3, the control participants clearly displayed a difference
in RTs between the 2 cues, whereas the individuals with
psycho pathy did not. There was a significant effect for cue
(F1,38 = 11.1, p = 0.002, η2 = 0.039), reflecting higher RTs to the
tall cue. The main effect for block (F2,76 = 0.565, p = 0.53, η2 =
0.006) and group (F1,38 = 3.20, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.078) did not
reach significance. A significant block × cue interaction was
present (F2,76 = 39.2, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.207), whereas the block ×
group (F2,76 = 0.124, p = 0.88, η2 = 0.001) and cue × group
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Fig. 2: Performance for each group in each experiment during the start of acquisition, end of acquisition and end of reversal phases. Mean
group reaction times are reported with the error bars indicating their corresponding standard error.
(F1,38 = 0.015, p = 0.90, η2 < 0.001) interactions were not signifi-
cant. More importantly, the block × cue × group interaction
was significant (F2,76 = 3.97, p = 0.023, η2 = 0.021). Bonferroni-
 corrected paired-samples t tests comparing RTs between the
2 cues in each block and for each group showed that in the
psychopathy group, the difference in RT between the 2 types
of cues was only significant at the end of the acquisition
phase (t20 = –4.94, pbonf < 0.001). However, in the control group,
the difference between cues was significant both at the end of
acquisition (t18 = –5.26, pbonf < 0.001) and at the end of the re-
versal phase (t18 = 5.39, pbonf < 0.001).
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate response re-
versal under automatic and controlled learning conditions in
individuals with psychopathy. The findings point out that the
presence of a response reversal deficit in individuals with
psychopathy is modulated by the context in which learning
occurs and are in line with the notion that some of the dis turb -
ances seen in individuals with psychopathy are related to a
reduced capacity to intentionally use and manipulate infor-
mation to adapt behaviour. More specifically, the results show
that the deficiency is not present when response reversal oc-
curs in a context in which automatic learning is predominant
(experiment 1). Interestingly, however, abnormal response re-
versal was found in individuals with psycho pathy when par-
ticipants were instructed to actively monitor and manipulate
associative relationships to perform successfully (experiment
2). The data also suggest that response reversal is not com-
pletely impaired in individuals with psycho pathy, but that
there is slower adaption of behaviour when the active use of
information is required. The latter corrob orates previous re-
sults showing delays in learning in individuals with psy-
chopathy.18 These findings have important implications for
current accounts of disturbed learning in these individuals.
The Integrated Emotion Systems (IES) model cannot accom-
modate the results from experiment 1. That is, when the true
nature of the task is made less salient by omitting any refer-
ence to the predictive relationship between stimuli, individu-
als with psychopathy are very capable of performing response
reversals successfully. However, the current formulation of the
IES model postulates general response reversal deficits in
those individuals, irrespective of learning context and level of
awareness. Therefore, one would not expect abnormal re-
sponse reversal to be limited to explicit learning conditions.
The distinction between automatic and controlled cogni-
tive processing in individuals with psychopathy offers novel
predictions. On a neurocognitive level, our results can be ex-
plained by considering the role of the prefrontal cortex (PFC)
in adapting behaviour. The PFC has been proposed to select -
ively bias cognitive processing to focus attention on relevant
information while de-emphasizing competing information,31
to use the relevant information to guide goal-directed behav-
iour.32 Cohen and colleagues32 originally classified this mech -
an ism as a driving force behind cognitive control, a term now
used to describe several types of cognitive functions. From
this perspective, the impaired response reversal in experi-
ment 2 indicates that by making the cues more salient, we
tapped into a deficiency in properly using information pro-
vided by both cues and imperative stimuli to guide behav-
iour in the psychopathy group, resulting in hampered
 response reversal. This interpretation is consistent with pre-
vious findings pointing out that inmates with psychopathy
showed impaired performance under dual-task conditions
when equal priority was given to both tasks33 and with more
recent results relating psychopathy to impairments in cogni-
tive control.34 Moreover, considering cognitive control deficits
also offers an explanation for the unaffected response rever-
sal found in experiment 1. Automatic processing is assumed
not to rely on the integrity of the (prefrontal) brain system
regulating cognitive control. During automatic learning in
experiment 1, this system was bypassed, resulting in normal
performance in the psychopathy group. Thus, the predictions
offered by the dichotomy between automatic and controlled
processing on a cognitive level converge with those made
based on the biasing mechanism being referred to as cogni-
tive control. However, there are also studies that used differ-
ent behavioural measures and reported unaffected cognitive
control in individuals with psychopathy.35,36 These studies
point out that not all aspects of cognitive control are compro-
mised or that different behavioural indexes vary in sensitiv-
ity and suitability depending on the function being assessed.
For instance, Blair and colleagues35 used a series of neuro -
psycho logical tests, each known to be sensitive to different
executive functions, in different cortical areas. Their results
indicated that the psychopathy group did not show deficien-
cies on behavioural measures preferentially sensitive to func-
tions of the anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex, whereas measures quantifying functions of the OFC did
show deficiencies.
Limitations
One limitation of the present study is that it could be argued
that nonpsychopathic offenders would have been a more
valid comparison group. However, previous studies have
shown that response reversal deficits are characteristic of
psychopathy relative to general antisociality in adult offender
samples6,7 and in children with high levels of psychopathic
traits.37 Accordingly, it was not our primary intention to re-
establish the link between response reversal deficits and
psycho pathy relative to generic antisociality. Furthermore,
the absence of a difference in experiment 1 between the
2 groups is especially noteworthy given that the comparison
involved more “contrasting” populations (psychopathic v.
healthy individuals) than those in many other studies with
similar sample sizes (psychopathic v. nonpsychopathic of-
fenders). If anything, this should have increased the chance
of detecting group differences in our experiment. Still, it will
be beneficial to replicate these results in a study that includes
a group of nonpsychopathic offenders. Reversal deficits have
also been reported in (poly)drug users,22 and psychopathy
has been linked to higher rates of (poly)drug use.38 One could
argue that the reversal deficit seen in experiment 2 could be
attributed to a history of drug use in the psychopathy group.
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However, (self-reported) rates of drug use in the patient sam-
ples did not differ between the 2 experiments (Table 1),
whereas the outcome did, implicating that drug use cannot
be responsible for the difference. Finally, another argument is
that the use of a different measure of response reversal (RTs
v. amount of reversal errors) compared with those used in
previous studies of adult psychopathy6,7 reduces the compar -
ability among studies. However, if disturbed response rever-
sal is an essential aspect of psychopathy, it should also be
present when a different method of assessing the same cogni-
tive mechanism is used, thus providing additional support
for the robustness of this cognitive deficiency. Further studies
are needed to address the exact impact of manipulating the
saliency of different pieces of information using these types
of paradigms.
Conclusion
The present study shows that deficient response reversal in
individuals with psychopathy can be modulated by altering
the nature of the learning context. The findings support the
notion that some aspects of automatic processing of behav-
iour are intact in individuals with psychopathy, but that dis-
turbances arise when information processing reaches con-
trolled stages of processing and has to be used to guide
goal-directed behaviour.14 This view suggests that abnormal
processing of information relevant for appropriate (re)adjust-
ment of current behaviour becomes apparent when individ -
uals with psychopathy have to actively monitor and manipu-
late information. These results also highlight the importance
of considering the way information is offered to offenders
with psychopathy during therapeutic interventions in foren-
sic psychiatry settings. Using approaches that rely on auto-
matic learning mechanisms might be an effective way to
modify rigid and disruptive behaviour.
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